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In this paper, we modify the Huang and Stoll (1997) spread-decomposing model
to fit multi-dealer markets. In a multi-dealer market, individual dealers can rebal-
ance their inventories either by trading with other dealers or changing the quote
price. Our modified model captures this feature. Using transaction data from the
Reuters D2000-1 system, we find that the order-processing and inventory control
components of the spread in the foreign exchange market are relatively small and
dealers may tolerate the unwanted inventory to keep the spread small to attract in-
formed orders. The asymmetric information component carries the biggest weight.
We study the time pattern of the spread and its components. The spread varies
significantly with the time of day, but the inventory control and asymmetric infor-
mation components do not.
1 Introduction
The bid-ask spread provides an important measure of trade costs and therefore mar-
ket liquidity. It follows that understanding the determination of both the spread and
its components is of interest. This paper makes two contributions to the literature.
First, it develops a new model for estimating and decomposing the spread, based on
the framework of Huang and Stoll (1997) (HS hereafter). In contrast to most existing
models which assume there is only one market maker (e.g. New York Stock Exchange,
NYSE), the new model is designed specifically for multi-dealer markets. We will refer
to the new model as the modified HS model (MHS model thereafter). Second, we in-
troduce time dummies in the MHS model so that we can study the intra-day pattern of
the spread and its components. Until now, there has been little research on the intra-
day spread pattern in the Reuters D2000-1 system, which is an important component
of the foreign exchange market, perhaps in part because spreads cannot be observed
but need to be estimated.
There are two kinds of inter-dealer market structures: the limited order book mar-
ket (the order-driven market) and the direct trade or sequential trade market (the
quote-driven market).a An example of the former is the Electronic Brokerage System
(EBS), while an example of the latter is the Reuters D2000-1 system. An order-driven
market does not have a market maker as it is organized as a two-sided auction. A
quote-driven market has one or more market makers (dealers) who supply the liq-
uidity and offer quotes to other market participants. Models designed to estimate the
spread and its decomposition are highly sensitive to the structure of the market. Huang
aSee Viswanathan and Wang (2004) for a more detailed description of the two markets.
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and Stoll (1997) develop a model for estimating the efficient spread and calculating the
fraction of each of its components. They show that covariance spread models and trade
indicator spread models are special cases of their model.
Although the HS model encompasses all other spread models, it very much reflects
the structure of NYSE, which has a single market maker for each stock. For other struc-
tures, the HS equations need to be interpreted differently. For example, McGroarty
et al. (2007) develop an alternative model for decomposing the spread specifically de-
signed for order-driven intra-dealer markets like the EBS. Their model uses the price
difference between the best buy and sell limit orders as the measure of the spread,
and then re-interprets one of the HS equations to estimate the decomposition. The
interpretation of the HS model in multi-dealer markets such as the Reuters D2000-
1 system has not been previously discussed. Multi-dealer markets allow individual
dealers to offload their inventory imbalances onto other dealers, and such inter-dealer
(“hot-potato”) trading is quantitatively important (Lyons 1995). This invalidates the
HS assumption that the inventory imbalances of dealers are equivalent to the sum of
all previous trades.
The unsuitability of the original HS model to the Reuters D2000-1 system is indi-
cated by the fact that one of the key predictions of the HS model fails to hold. In the
original HS model, an inventory imbalance is met by price adjustment designed to in-
duce customer trades in the opposite direction to those that have just occurred. Thus
the HS model predicts negative serial correlation of trade direction. Hot-potato trading
to reduce inventory imbalances is ruled out by assumption in the HS model, but if it is
prevalent trade direction will tend to be positively serially correlated, and this is what
we find in data from the Reuters D2000-1 system.
Here we derive a model for estimating and decomposing spreads in markets with
more than one market maker. The new model shares the same basic structure of the
HS model, but has a different interpretation. Using USD/DEM transaction data, we
compare the results for decomposing the spread obtained by the MHS and the HS
models. Unlike datasets from stock markets such as NYSE and NASDAQ, foreign
exchange datasets provide information about inter-dealer transactions.
The intra-day patterns of the bid-ask spread have been widely examined for a va-
riety of markets. For instance, McInish and Wood (1992) find that the spread of NYSE
stocks has a U-shaped intra-day pattern, while Chan et al. (1995)) find the inter-dealer
spread in NASDAQ exhibits an L-shaped pattern. Among studies of the foreign ex-
change market, Danı́elsson and Payne (2002) find a U-shaped spread pattern in the
Reuters D2000-2 trading system and Hua and Li (2011) find that the spread pattern
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of the JPY/USD pair in Electronic Broking Services (EBS) is U-shaped during Tokyo
trading hours and inverse U-shaped during London trading hours.
Because spread information is not always available, the literature studying the
intra-day spread pattern on the Reuters D2000-1 system, an important market structure
within the foreign exchange market, is very thin. Our modified HS model is specifi-
cally designed for the market structure of the Reuters D2000-1 system. We find that
spreads of the USD/DEM pair are inverse U-shaped during the Asia trading hours,
are stable during the European trading hours and become larger after the closing of
European markets. The inventory control part and the asymmetric information part
are stable during the day. The components of the spread are stable over the day.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. In Section 2, we briefly introduce
the HS model. In Section 3, we present our new model and compare the results with
the HS model. In Section 4, we introduce time dummies in order to study the intra-
day pattern of the spread. We use the model to analyse USD/DEM transaction data
collected from the Reuters D2000-1 system.
2 Theoretical Background
Bid-ask spreads reflect market-maker costs, which can be broken down into three
types. First, the order processing cost reflects dealers’ operating costs, such as labour
costs and platform commissions. Second, an asymmetric information cost is incurred
when a dealer trades with an agent with better information about the fundamental
price. Dealers will make losses when trading with better-informed agents unless they
set the spread to reflect this risk. Third, inventory control costs arise when a dealer
aims to keep inventories within a certain range. Market competition is another factor
that can influence the spread. A general model of the spread based on Bollen et al.
(2004) can be written as:
SPt = (OPt, ICt, ASt, COMt) (1)
or more specifically,
SPt = OPt + ICt + ASt + COMt (2)
where SPt is the efficient bid-ask spread, OPt is the order processing cost, ICt is the
inventory control cost, ASt is the asymmetric information cost, and COMt is the degree
of competition. A model in which the spread is the dependent variable can be called a
spread determination model.
The time pattern of the bid-ask spread can be modelled using the following regres-
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SPt = τ1 + ∑ τitimedummyi + εt (3)
This model is particularly useful for studying the intra-day pattern. As in the
spread determination model, the spread is the dependent variable in this model, but
now, the independent variables are time dummies instead of proxy variables. Equation
(3) will be called the spread description model (SD model) in this paper.
The Huang and Stoll model (HS model) aims to estimate the bid-ask spread and
to decompose it into its components, using information about transactions prices and
trade direction. The structure of the HS model is as follows.
The price of an asset can be decomposed into the bid-ask spread and the mid-price,
or the midpoint between the bid price and the ask price. Formally, the price is given
by:




where s is the transaction price and Mt is the mid-price. SP is the bid-ask spread, BS is






The spread will affect the return only when the direction of the trade changes (BSt −
BSt−1 ̸= 0). Then the return is given by:
∆st = ∆Mt +
SP
2
(BSt − BSt−1) (6)
where ∆ is the first-order difference operator.
The mid-price depends not only on the fundamental value of the asset but also
on the degree of divergence from the ideal inventory level. This is because dealers
are assumed to adjust the mid-price to correct their inventory imbalances. Crucially,
inventory imbalances are equated with the sum of all previous trades. This assumption
is reasonable within the context of a mono-dealer market, where all trades are between
customers and a single dealer. If the dealer starts with ideal inventory levels before
trading begins, then the sum of trades will exactly reflect the deviation of inventories
from the ideal level. Formally, the mid-price is given by:







where Ft is the fundamental, and SP2 is the half spread. Taking the first-order difference
of Equation (7) gives:
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Equation (8) shows that the change in the mid-price is a function of the change in the
fundamental and the incoming order in the previous period, where β · SP2 gives the
effect of the inventory level on the mid-price.
If dealers are aware of serial autocorrelation in the order flow, then given the order
flow in the previous period, dealers know the conditional expectation of the order flow
in the current period. Dealers are aware that customers may be better informed about
the fundamental value, and so the direction of the most recent trade (relative to its
expectation) affects their beliefs about the fundamental value. Formally, the change in
the fundamental value can be written as:
∆Ft = α SP2 BSt−1 − α
SP
2 [E(BSt−1|BSt−2)]
= α SP2 BSt−1 − α
SP
2 (1 − 2θ)BSt−2
(9)
where α SP2 is the effect of an incoming order on the dealer’s beliefs about the funda-
mental value, and θ is the probability of an order reversal. The conditional expectation
of an incoming order BSt−1 given that BSt−2 is known can be written as:
E(BSt−1|BSt−2) = (1 − 2θ)BSt−2 (10)










(1 − 2θ)BSt−2 + εt (11)
Let ϑ = (1 − 2θ). θ can be estimated from
BSt−1 = ϑBSt−2 + εt (12)
The generalised method of moments is used to estimate the two equations simultane-
ously.
The weight of inventory control costs on the bid-ask spread is given by β, and the
weight of asymmetric information costs is given by α. 1 − α − β is the weight of the
other factors influencing the bid-ask spread, which include order processing costs and
market competition.
3 Modified HS Model
The question is how to adapt the HS model to a multi-dealer market. The first point
is that in such a market there are two types of trade: between dealers and customers,
and between one dealer and another. Trades between dealers arise because dealers
can adjust their inventories by placing orders with other dealers. According to King
5
Page 6 of 25
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ijfe






























































et al. (2013, p. 98), inter-dealer trades constitute about 30% of all trades in the foreign
exchange market.
Evans and Lyons (2002) develop a model to describe the price formation process
in a multi-dealer market such as the Reuters D2000-1 system. In each day there are
assumed to be three rounds of dealing. In the first round, dealers trade with the non-
dealer public and collect private information from customer order flows. In the second
round, dealers trade with each other, and thus the private information spreads through
the market and becomes public. In the third round, dealers quote prices based on
the aggregate information from the second round and trade with the public again,
with the aim of returning their inventories to the desired level. Thus customer order
flow is transmitted initially only to individual dealers, and is aggregated at the second
stage through inter-dealer trading. At the third stage prices adjust to induce inventory
correction, as assumed in the HS model.
Osler et al. (2011) show that, in the foreign exchange market, dealers do not widen
spreads to customers to deal with asymmetric information, as the HS model assumes.
Instead they even reduce the spread to informed customers in an effort to acquire
such information, which they can then exploit profitably in inter-dealer trading. This
highlights the possibility that spreads may differ between types of trades: inter-dealer
trades, trades with informed customers and trades with uninformed customers.
In a multi-dealer market there is not an equivalence between the sum of all pre-
vious trades and the aggregate inventory imbalance of dealers; this would only be
true if inter-dealer trades were excluded, for inter-dealer trades are recycling inven-
tory imbalances from one dealer to another, rather than creating new ones. Thus the
HS model would only work if the data related exclusively to customer trades. In fact
the 1996 data used by Evans and Lyons (2002), and also by us below, relate exclusively
to inter-dealer trades. Inter-dealer trades are assumed to result from inventory imbal-
ances of the initiating dealer. These imbalances would initially be a consequence of the
initiating dealer’s trading with customers, but could subsequently reflect “hot-potato”
trading by other dealers.
Consider the case where customers are net buyers of dollars. In general, a minor-
ity of individual dealers will find themselves accumulating dollars in the first round,
because their customers are net sellers. Thus the aggregate of absolute inventory im-
balances of individual dealers will be greater than or equal to the aggregate market
imbalance. It is easiest to focus on the case where this is an equality, i.e. all dealers
have customers who are net buyers of dollars. Assume that at the first stage of round
two, each dealer tries to buy a proportion v of his inventory imbalance from another
6
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dealer, where 0 ≤ v ≤ 1. However, this only recycles the aggregate imbalance between
dealers. At the second stage dealers try to recycle a proportion v, and so on. The aggre-
gate imbalance is evenly distributed among traders eventually. Then, if the aggregate
inventory imbalance is X, total interdealer trades Z will be given by:
Z = k1 · X (13)
where k1 ≥ 1. The appendix shows that when there are N dealers in the market, if
each dealer trades 1N of his total imbalance with every other dealer, i.e. v =
N−1
N , the
equilibrium is achieved at the first stage. Then the sum of total inter-dealer trades
equals the average inventory imbalance. In any other cases, the sum of total inter-
dealer trades should exceed the aggregate inventory imbalance. Thus, k1 is a measure
of the efficiency of imbalance re-distribution. When k1 = 1, the re-distribution is at its






Another difference between the HS model and our modified HS model is how the
dealer’s inventory level is determined. This difference is driven by different market
structures. Dealers in a multi-dealer market control inventory differently from dealers
in a single dealer market. A dealer can control his inventory using either the passive
or the active method. The passive method is to adjust the mid-quote to attract an
order flow in the opposite direction of the previous flow. The active method is to
either initiate a trade directly (in quote-driven markets such as Reuters D2000-1) or
make a market or a limit order (in order-driven markets such as EBS). The direction
of this order is the same as that of the previous order. The first method is considered
and explained in spread-estimating models of the stock market (e.g., the HS model).
The second method is first modelled in a theoretical paper specifically describing the
foreign exchange market (Lyons 1997). Dealers in the HS model can only use the first
method, whereas dealers who are in a multi-dealer market can use both methods.
Using the first method, as in the HS model, a dealer has to wait for an incom-
ing order and faces uncertainty about this incoming order. The second method is
more efficient because a dealer can return the inventory to the ideal level immediately
and surely. The literature suggests that dealers rebalance inventory very quickly (e.g.
Lyons 1997, Bjønnes and Rime 2005, Osler et al. 2011). King et al. (2013) suggest that a
dealer does not change the price when his inventory is different from the desired level.
Lyons (1997) and Evans and Lyons (2002) emphasise that in the foreign exchange inter-
dealer market, a quote-driven market, dealers exchange price information and control
7
Page 8 of 25
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ijfe






























































the inventory through hot potato trading, in which dealers make an order right after
receiving an order in the same direction. Thus, they use the second method to control
the inventory.
In the HS model, for a dealer in a single dealer market, an inventory imbalance




BSi in equation 7). Having an efficient
method to control the inventory, dealers in a multi-dealer market can get rid of un-
wanted inventory fast and can tolerate some amount of unwanted inventory without
moving the price. We define the inventory imbalance which would influence mid-
prices as the intolerable inventory. The intolerable inventory is less than or equal to the
unwanted inventory because of dealers’ tolerance. Formally, the amount of intolerable






where 0 < k2 < 1. k2 is a measure of the dealer’s ability to keep the intolerable inven-
tory close to zero by using his/her own order (the active method). k2 = 0 suggests that
the dealer can eliminate all the unwanted inventory or tolerate them. k2 = 1 suggests
that the dealer cannot eliminate the unwanted inventory at all, which is the case of the
HS model. The most recent order is yet to be taken into account. Therefore, if dealer d
received an incoming order at period t − 1, dealer d’s inventory level at period t is the







We assume dealers in the market are identical. Then an initiating trader chooses
a quote dealer randomly. Under these circumstances, dealers’ cumulated incoming
orders are identical in the long run. If there are N dealers in the market, the cumu-
lated incoming orders are evenly distributed among dealers. Taking Equation (14) into
account, dealer d’s cumulated incoming order at period t-2 is given as follows:




BSi,d = k1BSt−1 +
1
N





If the trade is observed by other participants in the market, then, dealer d’s inven-
tory information is known by the participants i.e. it has become new public informa-
tion. Then, all participants will update their quotes as a response to the trade that has
just happened. If the no-arbitrage condition, which suggests all dealers’ quotes at any
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time are the same, is valid, it makes sure that dealer d’s quote increment be the quote
increment in the whole market. Therefore, we re-write Equation (7) as follows:














Taking the first-order difference of Equation (17), we obtain that:
∆Mt = ∆Ft + β ·
SP
2










Equation (18) suggests that inventory control costs influence the mid-price through
the two most recent orders, whereas in the original HS model, inventory control costs
affected the mid-price only through the most recent order. When there is only one
dealer in the market and thus the deal cannot use the active method to manage his/her
inventory (k1 = k2 = N = 1), the equation above reduces to the HS model.
The setting of asymmetric information costs is the same as the HS model. Substi-
tuting Equation (9) into Equation (18) gives the change in mid-price,
∆Mt = α · SP2 · BSt−1 − α(1 − 2θ) ·
SP
2 · BSt−1 + β ·
SP








= (α + k1β) · SP2 · BSt−1 −
[




· SP2 · BSt−2
(19)
Taking the order possessing cost into account, we can finally obtain the modified



















The regression of our new model is the same as that of the HS model, but the third
term has a different meaning. It now represents both α and β rather than α only. The
new model will be called the modified HS model (MHS model for short) in this paper.
The HS model is a special case of the MHS model when there is only one market maker
in the market.
Equation (20) suggests that when k1 is very big, i.e. when the inter-dealer trades
significantly exaggerate the aggregate inventory imbalance, the inventory components
should be zero (β = 0). The inventory component is negatively correlated with the
number of dealers in the market and dealers’ ability of tolerating/eliminating un-
wanted inventory. When there are many dealers in the market (N is big) or the dealer
can keep intolerable inventory small (k2 is small), the inventory component is small.
We cannot know the values of k1 and k2. Therefore, the MHS model can generate
only a range for the components of the spread, rather than a precise number.
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Assuming that the imbalance re-distribution process is efficient (k1 = 1), when the
intolerable inventory is zero (k2 = 0) or there are infinite dealers in the market (N = ∞),




BSt + (α + β − 1)
SP
2
BSt−1 − [α(1 − 2θ) + β]
SP
2
BSt−2 + εt (21)
The decomposition results show the lower bound of the inventory component and the
upper bound of the asymmetric information component. Equation (21) can be called
low-inventory-MHS model (LIMHS model).
When there is only one dealer in the market (N = 1), and thus the dealer does
not tolerate the unwanted inventory (k2 = 1), the MHS model is the same as the HS
model, and the results show the upper bound of the inventory component and the
lower bound of the asymmetric information components.
4 Decomposing the Spread in the Reuters D2000-1 Sys-
tem
In this section, we decompose the bid-ask spread of the USD/DEM pair in the Reuters
D2000-1 system. We first discuss how the MHS model fits the microstructure of the
Reuters D2000-1 system. Then we discuss the range of the components of the spread.
4.1 The Reuters D2000-1 system and the MHS model
In the previous section, we developed the MHS model for a multi-dealer market. The
Reuters D2000-1 system is a multi-dealer market. However, the MHS model requires
trade information to be known by all participants in the market, which is not the case
for the Reuters D2000-1 system. We argue here that as long as the no-arbitrage condi-
tion is valid, the MHS model fits the microstructure of the Reuters D2000-1 system.
We first introduce the basic organisation of the Reuters D2000-1 system. Trades on
D2000-1 happen between two anonymous dealers: a calling dealer who requires quotes
and a quoting dealer. The quoting dealer offers bid and ask prices to the calling dealer.
The calling dealer has to make a quick decision to buy dollars (make a positive order
flow) or sell dollars (make a negative order flow) or reject the quote. If a transaction is
made, the time and the direction will be recorded by the system. Two things need to be
mentioned. First, traders can only observe their own trading records. Second, though
both bid and ask prices (two series of exchange rates) were quoted by the calling deal-
ers, only the price that reflects the direction of actual trade is in the dataset (and the
10
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price may be slightly more favourable to the trader than the quote). Both prices and
volumes of trades are not observed by traders other than the two participants.
Dealers on the Reuters D2000-1 system can keep requesting quotes from other deal-
ers, so that price information is de facto known by all dealers in the market all the time,
and thus quotes from different dealers should be the same at every point of time, oth-
erwise there will be arbitrage. When dealer d receives an incoming order, he/she will
update his/her quote based on the private information in the order and the inventory
imbalance caused by the order. At the time, dealer d is the only one who receives an or-
der; he/she therefore is the only one in the market who update his/her quote, because
other dealers do not have new information. By requesting quotes, all dealers know
dealer d’s price increment and update their own quotes instantly. Then, though the
incoming order flow is unobserved, information about it is incorporated into the price
instantly. The assumption of the MHS model is actually satisfied. Therefore, one can
conclude that the MHS model fits the microstructure of the Reuters D2000-1 system.
4.2 Empirical Results
Our empirical results are based on inter-dealer transaction data for the USD/DEM pair
on the Reuters D2000-1 system from 1 May 1996 to 2 September 1996, the same dataset
as used by Evans and Lyons (2002).
Our data have several features. First, the quote data have irregular time spaces.
Second, the trade densities vary with the time of the day. For example, the number of
trades in GMT 10:00-11:00 is much greater than the number in GMT 1:00-2:00.
We begin by estimating the spread Equation (20) on the assumption that the spread
remains constant throughout. As mentioned earlier, the estimating equation is the
same for the HS and LIMHS models; it is merely the interpretation that is different. Ta-
ble (1) shows the results of the regressions of the HS and the LIMHS models. Table (2)
gives the interpretations of the coefficients of these regressions, where we can find the
ranges of the components of the spread. There are 382 dealers who trade USD/DEM
pair in the Reuter D2000-1 system (Evans 1998), so the LIMHS model is likely to pro-
vide a more accurate estimate.
The estimate of the half-spread is γ1 in Table (1), and so the average bid-ask spread
of USD/DEM is 0.0000794 in percentage terms or 1.2 pips. Goodhart et al. (2002) find
a 2.84 pips spread on average on the Reuters D2000-2 system. Lyons (1995) suggests
a 3 pips spread on average from a big USD/DEM dealer. Evans (1998) finds 6 pips
of quoted spread from the FXFX dataset. Our data are values of the tradable spread
in the market, so this spread should be narrower than the others. γ2 reflects the ef-
11
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fect of order-processing costs and market competition, and according to both models
these factors explain 14.41% of the spread according to Table (2). The difference be-
tween the HS and the LIMHS models is the interpretation of γ3, which influences the
decomposition of the spread into inventory control and asymmetric information com-
ponents. According to Table (2), the HS model suggests that the contributions of the
inventory control cost and the asymmetric information cost to the spread are 20.4% and
65.2% respectively. The LIMHS model suggests that the shares of the inventory control
cost and the asymmetric information cost in the spread are −1.52% and 87.11% respec-
tively. Both the HS and the LIMHS models find that the asymmetric information cost is
a dominant component of the spread. According to the Evans and Lyons (2002) model,
the main purpose of the inter-dealer trading is to exchange the private information in
the customer order flow. It is risky to trade with traders who have private information.
Furthermore, having an efficient inventory control method implies that the inventory
control cost is relatively low. Therefore, it is not a surprise that the asymmetric infor-
mation cost is greater than the inventory control cost. Because the HS model does not
consider the active method of inventory management, it might overestimate the share
of the inventory control cost. In contrast, the negative share of the inventory control
cost in the spread given by the LIMHS model is very interesting. The most important
finding is that the inventory control cost is very close to zero, which coincides with
the main point of the LIMHS model that dealers use an efficient method to manage
their inventory level. This finding is consistent with Bjønnes and Rime (2005), who
use dealer inventory data from Reuters D2000-1 and find that inventory control does
not have a big price effect. Furthermore, there is a debatable explanation of the neg-
ative share of inventory control cost, which needs further research in the future. We
can interpret the negative share as a compensation of the asymmetric information cost.
Dealers in the market do not worry very much about the inventory because they can
get rid of unwanted inventory quickly, while the risk arising because of asymmetric
information is high. To protect themselves from the loss of trading with an informed
trader, dealers set big spreads. However, the big spread reduces liquidity and thus the
information exchange in the market. To keep liquidity high so that they can collect
private information and cover the asymmetric information cost, dealers may sacrifice
the inventory control cost. In other words, they could offer a negative spread in terms
of the inventory control cost to encourage trading.
Compared to the HS model, the asymmetric information cost has an even greater
share in the spread in the LIMHS model. As mentioned earlier, the HS model does not
match the Reuters D2000-1 system, while the LIMHS model captures many features of
12
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the system. Therefore, the results of the LIMHS model are more likely to be true or
yield values closer to the true values than the HS model.
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5 Time Patterns of the Spread and Its Components
In this section, we study how the estimated bid-ask spread varies over time. Most
previous papers that have investigated this issue have used quoted spread data, which
can be regressed directly on time dummies. Here the spread has to be estimated. By
introducing time dummies and interaction terms between time dummies and the trade
indicator variables in equation (20), we can capture the time pattern of the spread as
well as the time patterns of the components of the spread in one single regression.
To incorporate the time dummy variables into the MHS model, we can substitute
Equation (3) into Equation (20) and control the time dummy variables in the intercept
term, so that the new model is now given by:
∆st = 12(τ1 + ∑ τi · timedummyi) · BSt +
1
2(τ1 + ∑ τi · timedummyi)
·(α + k1β − 1) · BSt−1 − 12(τ1 + ∑ τi · timedummyi)
·
[





+∑ µi · timedummyi + εt
(22)
Re-arranging the equation, we have,
∆st = 12 [τ1 · BSt + τ1 · (α + k1β − 1) · BSt−1 − τ1 ·
[





+12 · Σ[τi · timedummyi ·BSt + τi · (α + k1β − 1) · timedummyi ·BSt−1 − τi
·
[




· timedummyi ·BSt−2] + ∑ µi · timedummyi + εt
= 12 [τ1 · BSt + Φ1 · BSt−1 − Λ1 · BSt−2] +
1
2 · Σ[τi · timedummyi
·BSt + Φi · timedummyi ·BSt−1 − Λi · timedummyi ·BSt−2]
+∑ µi · timedummyi + εt
(23)
where Φi = τi · (α + k1β − 1) and Λi = τi ·
[




, then we can
obtain all the parameters.
There are three groups of time dummies: (1) for studying the intra-hour pattern, we
use 11 minute-dummies which represent 12 five-minute intervals in each hour (FIVE1
= 1 if the quote is in the first five minutes in the hour, in other words within the in-
terval :00-:05); (2) for studying the intra-day pattern, we use 23 hour-dummies which
represent 24 hours in each day (H1 = 1 if the quote is in the interval 1:00-2:00); and
(3) for studying the week pattern, we use four day-name-dummies which represent
five working days in a week (D1 = 1 if the quote occurs on Monday). There are three
regressions with different groups of time dummies.
For brevity, we do not show the results of the regressions directly. Instead, Tables
(3), (4) and (5) show coefficients of trade indicators (BS) and decomposition results
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at each time interval, which are calculated using the regression results. Because the
components of the spread are closer to the LIMHS model, we only report the decom-
position results of the LIMHS model.
Table (3) shows the intra-hour pattern of the spread. We use 11 minute-dummies
in regression (23). According to the regression, overall, spreads are not significantly
different among the five-minute intervals in an hour, however, spreads in the first five
minutes are significantly lower than at other times. The decomposition results are
shown in the last three columns of the tables. Asymmetric information costs are the
dominant source of spreads on the D2000-1 trading system, and the weights of the
components of the spread do not change significantly over time. In most cases, the
shares of the asymmetric information costs are between 70% and 90%, which coincides
with the results in section (3). In several time intervals (:10-:14, :25-:33, :55-:59), the
share of asymmetric information costs is more than 90% and the share of inventory
control costs is negative, which suggests that the inventory control costs are used to
compensate for the asymmetric information costs. The official economic data and pol-
icy are usually released at :00, :15, :30, and, therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the
share of asymmetric information costs is higher at those times.
Table (4) shows the intra-day pattern of the spread. We use 23 hour-dummies in
regression (23). These intra-day spreads are also highly volatile and do not follow the
smooth reverse J-curve found in the NYSE (McInish and Wood 1992). Similar to the
finding in Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993), who use USD/DEM data collected from
“Reuters’ network screens”, the spreads at 5:00, which is lunchtime in the Japanese
market, are much higher than those at other hours. The trading hours of the Tokyo
market are 1:00 to 9:00, so the spread has an inverse U-shape in the Tokyo market,
which operates during the off-peak trading hours of the USD/DEM pair. Hua and Li
(2011) also find that spreads of JPY/USD have an inverse U-shape in their off-peak
trading hours, which are during the London market. During heavy trading hours,
spreads are stable. After the closing of the London market at 17:00, spreads become
larger. Contrary to previous findings, spreads during Asian trading hours are much
lower than during the hours of other markets except for the peak around 5:00. The
decomposition results are shown in the last three columns in the tables. Similar to
the regression which uses five-minute dummies, asymmetric information costs are the
dominant source of spreads, and the weights of the components of the spread do not
significantly change over time. In peak-trading hours, the share of the asymmetric
information costs is between 70% and 90%, which coincides with the results in section
(3). In some time interval (1:00-3:00, 17:00-18:00, 21:00-22:00, 23:00-24:00) the share of
15
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order processing costs is negative (the coefficient of BSt−1 is positive). This is because
the coefficient is not significantly different from zero, and the coefficient is not stable. In
the off-peak trading hours, the share of asymmetric information costs are much greater
than peak trading hours. In off-peak trading hours, end-users may have a greater share
of fundamental information, because at this time end-users’ of curries is for trading
with foreigners or hedging their foreign exchange risk rather than speculation. At this
time, order flows in the interdealer market may include more fundamental information
from end-users, and thus, dealers may face a greater asymmetric information cost.
Table (5) shows the week pattern of the spread. We use four day-name-dummies
in regression (23). Though the coefficients on the day name dummies suggest that
spreads are slightly higher on Friday than on other days, only the coefficient on the
Thursday dummy is statistically significant at the 10% level. Unlike the EBS data in Ito
and Hashimoto (2006), these data do not exhibit a U-shaped intra-day spread pattern.
The shares of the components of the spread are not different on different days. The
share of asymmetric information cost on Thursday is slightly higher than other days.
Figure (1) shows the pattern of spreads of the USD/DEM pair for the whole week.
There are no significant differences across the trading days in a week. The spreads
have an inverse U-shape pattern during the off-peak trading hours of the USD/DEM
pair. Spreads during European trading hours are lower than those after the closing of
the European markets.
6 Conclusion
The spread-estimating and decomposition model of Huang and Stoll (1997) was de-
signed with a mono-dealer market such as the New York Stock Exchange in mind. The
model assumes that dealers’ inventory imbalances can only be resolved through price
adjustment. In a multi-dealer market this assumption is true of aggregate inventories,
but individual dealers can rebalance their inventories quickly by trading with other
dealers. Two assumptions of the HS model therefore break down in multi-dealer mar-
kets: trade direction tends to be positively rather than negatively serially correlated,
because of this “hot-potato” trading, and aggregate inventory imbalances are not in
general equal to the signed sum of all previous trades.
We have modified the HS model to take account of these features of multi-dealer
markets. The original HS model is a special case of this modified model. The estimat-
ing equation is the same as in the HS model, but its interpretation is different. Our
model tends to assign a higher proportion of the spread to the asymmetric informa-
16
Page 17 of 25
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ijfe






























































tion part of the spread, at the expense of the inventory control component. Applying
the new model to inter-dealer transaction data of the USD/DEM pair on the Reuters
D2000-1 system, we have found that the asymmetric information part is the dominant
component of the spread and the weight of the inventory control part is very low.
Incorporating time dummies, the model can be used to analyse the intra-day pat-
tern of the spread as well as the components of the spread. In the foreign exchange
market spreads have a hill-shaped pattern during off-peak trading hours. Spreads are
stable during peak trading hours and are significantly lower after the closing of the Eu-
ropean markets. The asymmetric information and the inventory control components
of spreads do not change significantly over time.
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∆st = γ1BSt + γ2BSt−1 − γ3BSt−2 + constant + εt
BSt × 10−3 BSt−1 × 10−3 BSt−2 × 10−3 constant × 10−3 R2 N
0.0397*** -0.00572*** -0.00184* −1.55 × 10−4 0.0105 257387
(52.17) (-7.52) (-2.42) (-0.20 )
BSt−1 = constant + µBSt−2 + εt
BSt−2 constant R2 N
0.0707*** 0.465*** 0.0050 257391
(35.95) (334.34 )
This table present the results of the following regressions
∆st = γ1BSt + γ2BSt−1 − γ3BSt−2 + constant + εt
BSt−1 = constant + µBSt−2 + εt.
Both the HS and the MHS models use these regressions.
Tick-by-tick USD/DEM transaction data from 1996.5.1 to 1996.9.2 on the Reuters
D2000-1 system are used.
BSt is the trade direction indicator in period t which is 1 if there is a buy order and is
−1 if there is a sell order.
N is the number of the observations.
T-statistics is in the parenthesis
*Significant at 5% level ***Significant at 0.1% level
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Table 2: Explanations of the Regressions
USD/DEM
spread OP IC AS θ
HS 0.0000794 14.41% 20.4% 65.2% 0.4647
LIMHS 0.0000794 14.41% -1.52% 87.11% 0.4647
This table present the results of the HS model (regressions 11 and 12)
and the LIMHS model (regressions 21 and 12).
The row of HS is about the HS model.
The row of LIMHS is about the LIMHS model.
spread is the estimated spread
OP is the weight of the order processing cost on the spread (1− α − β in
the HS and the LIMHS model).
IC is the weight of the inventory control cost on the spread (β in the HS
and the LIMHS model).
AS is the weight of the asymmetric information cost on the spread.(α in
the HS and the LIMHS model).
θ is probability of order direction reversal, and is calcualted from the
results of regression (12)
Table 3: Coefficient the Spread Against the Five-minute Dummies USD/DEM
Minutes BSt × 10−5 BSt−1 × 10−5 BSt−2 × 10−5 θ other IC AS Fraction
0 - 4 3.34 -0.274 -0.471 0.471 8.2 % 9.23 % 82.57 % 8.38 %
5 - 9 3.619 -0.907 -0.22 0.47 25.06 % 1.64 % 73.3 % 8.62 %
10 - 14 4.051 -0.307 -0.115 0.462 7.58 % -4.47 % 96.89 % 8.20 %
15 - 19 4.511 -0.496 -0.392 0.461 10.99 % 1.96 % 87.05 % 8.23 %
20 - 24 4.161 -0.622 -0.249 0.466 14.95 % 0.2 % 84.85 % 8.13 %
25 - 29 4.113 -0.718 0.044 0.465 17.46 % -7.39 % 89.93 % 8.14 %
30 - 34 3.761 -0.885 0.349 0.465 23.53 % -15.67 % 92.14 % 8.21 %
35 - 39 4.571 -0.63 -0.351 0.466 13.78 % 2.02 % 84.19 % 8.81 %
40 - 44 3.449 -0.418 -0.297 0.463 12.12 % 2.2 % 85.68 % 8.71 %
45 - 49 4.191 -0.189 -0.562 0.464 4.51 % 6.95 % 88.54 % 8.37 %
50 - 54 3.96 -1.016 -0.025 0.463 25.66 % -5.31 % 79.65 % 8.09 %
55 - 59 3.88 -0.422 0.0923 0.46 10.88 % -10.34 % 99.46 % 8.09 %
F-value 2.1* 1.05 0.95
Tick-by-tick USD/DEM transaction data from 1996.5.1 to 1996.9.2 on the Reuters D2000-1 system are used.
The results are obtained by the MHSD model (Equation 23) with 11 five-minute-dummies.
BSt is the trade direction indicator in period t which is 1 if there is a buy order and is −1 if there is a sell
order.
OP is the weight of the order processing cost on the spread (1 − α − β in the LIMHS model).
IC is the weight of the inventory control cost on the spread (β in the LIMHS model).
AS is the weight of the asymmetric information cost on the spread.(α in the LIMHS model).
θ is probability of order direction reversal, and is calcualted from the results of regression (12)
Fraction is the fraction of total number of trades in relevant intervals
F-value is the results of the F-test which the null-hypothesis is all the dummies corresponding to the variable
are zeros.
* Significant at 5% level
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Table 4: Coefficient the Spread Against the Hour Dummies USD/DEM
Hours BSt × 10−5 BSt−1 × 10−5 BSt−2 × 10−5 θ other IC AS Fraction
0 - 1 2.94 -0.167 -0.0823 0.463 5.68 % -4.5 % 98.82 % 0.50%
1 - 2 1.181 0.147 0.0224 0.417 -12.45 % -24.72 % 137.17 % 0.72%
2 - 3 0.905 0.552 -0.541 0.431 -60.99 % 43.64 % 117.35 % 1.89%
3 - 4 4.44 -1.757 -0.0662 0.449 39.57 % -5.27 % 65.7 % 2.04%
4 - 5 7.98 -1.317 1.496 0.448 16.5 % -30.63 % 114.12 % 1.60%
5 - 6 1.751 -0.867 0.514 0.417 49.51 % -45.22 % 95.71 % 0.62%
6 - 7 3.92 -1.067 -0.119 0.45 27.22 % -4.7 % 77.48 % 1.06%
7 - 8 3.85 -0.877 0.115 0.463 22.78 % -9.34 % 86.56 % 3.04%
8 - 9 3.86 -0.557 -0.0668 0.472 14.43 % -3.17 % 88.74 % 6.49%
9 - 10 3.83 -0.567 0.0147 0.468 14.8 % -6.18 % 91.37 % 9.52%
10 - 11 3.86 -0.353 -0.423 0.476 9.15 % 7 % 83.85 % 9.45%
11 - 12 4.16 -0.301 -0.39 0.47 7.24 % 4.06 % 88.7 % 7.44%
12 - 13 4.2 -0.617 0.0698 0.467 14.69 % -7.89 % 93.2 % 6.36%
13 - 14 4.16 -0.657 -0.236 0.471 15.79 % 0.77 % 83.44 % 7.20%
14 - 15 3.92 -0.567 -0.108 0.468 14.46 % -2.91 % 88.45 % 9.79%
15 - 16 3.62 -0.627 -0.12 0.468 17.32 % -2.18 % 84.85 % 9.84%
16 - 17 5.36 -0.907 -0.0649 0.463 16.92 % -5.32 % 88.4 % 8.80%
17 - 18 5.02 0.253 -1.524 0.46 -5.04 % 23.94 % 81.1 % 5.87%
18 - 19 5.21 -0.937 -1.264 0.446 17.98 % 17.31 % 64.7 % 3.06%
19 - 20 4.48 -0.365 -1.194 0.446 8.15 % 18.81 % 73.05 % 1.61%
20 - 21 4.04 -0.547 1.186 0.473 13.54 % -35.94 % 122.4 % 1.19%
21 - 22 4.06 0.174 -0.0711 0.474 -4.29 % -3.93 % 108.22 % 0.75%
22 - 23 4.77 -0.947 -1.524 0.469 19.85 % 28.8 % 51.35 % 0.61%
23 - 24 1.59 0.553 -0.0642 0.458 -34.78 % -7.84 % 142.62 % 0.55%
F-value 5.48*** 1.04 1.22
Tick-by-tick USD/DEM transaction data from 1996.5.1 to 1996.9.2 on the Reuters D2000-1 system are used.
The results are obtained by the MHSD model (Equation 23) with 23 hour-dummies.
Settings in this table are the same as in Table (3)
*** Significant at 0.1% level
Table 5: Coefficient the Spread Against the Day Dummies USD/DEM
Days BSt × 10−5 BSt−1 × 10−5 BSt−2 × 10−5 θ other IC AS Fraction
Monday 3.92 -0.437 -0.23 0.467 11.15 % -0.02 % 88.87 % 15.90 %
Tuesday 4 -0.475 -0.22 0.469 11.88 % 0.09 % 88.04 % 21.47 %
Wedsday 3.89 -0.644 -0.14 0.465 16.56 % -2.44 % 85.88 % 21.34 %
Thursday 3.82 -0.669 0 0.458 17.51 % -7.53 % 90.02 % 21.11 %
Friday 4.22 -0.606 -0.35 0.465 14.36 % 2.44 % 83.2 % 20.18 %
F-value 0.85 0.35 0.61
Tick-by-tick USD/DEM transaction data from 1996.5.1 to 1996.9.2 on the Reuters D2000-1 system are used.
The results are obtained by the MHSD model (Equation 23) with 4 day-dummies.
Settings in this table are the same as Table (3)
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Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday
Figure 1: Week Spread USDDEM
This figure shows the time pattern of the spread in a whole week.
The spread is estimated by the MHSD model (Equation 23) with 11 five-minute-dummies, 23
hour-dummies and 4 day-dummies.
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We assume that there are two dealers, a and b, in the market. After receiving cus-
tomers’ orders, the inventory imbalances of dealers a and b are given by Ia and Ib
respectively. The total inventory imbalance is Ia + Ib and the average inventory imbal-
ance is 0.5(Ia + Ib). Dealers a and b trade with each other to get rid of their imbalance.
Suppose, at the first stage, both of them choose a proportion v of their inventory imbal-
ance to trade. Then dealer a’s inventory imbalance is given by (1 − v)Ia + vIb. Dealer
b’s imbalance is given by (1 − v)Ib + vIa. The aggregate trading volume is v(Ia + Ib).
Suppose, at the second stage, they choose a proportion v to trade. Dealer a’s inventory
imbalance now is given by,
(1 − v)[(1 − v)Ia + vIb] + v[(1 − v)Ib + vIa]
dealer b’s imbalance is given by
v[(1 − v)Ia + vIb] + (1 − v)[(1 − v)Ib + vIa]
The aggregate trading volume is 2v(Ia + Ib) from stage one. The trade will be contin-
uous until the imbalance is the same for each dealer, i.e. 0.5(Ia + Ib). Suppose there
are n stages. Then the aggregate trading volume is n · v(Ia + Ib). Dealers’ inventory







When v = 0.5, the equilibrium is reached after one trade, and the aggregate trading
volume is the average inventory imbalance. When v is different from 0.5, more trades
are needed and the aggregate trading volume is greater than the average inventory
imbalance. If there are N traders in the market, the optimal strategy is that v should be
N−1
N , and a dealer should trade with all others with
1
N of his inventory imbalance.
The intuition is that the aggregate trading volume is determined by the choice of
v and dealers’ strategies. Any strategies different from the optimal strategy will make
the aggregate trading volume to be greater than the average inventory imbalance.
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